The Tax Rentals-a Flaw in the Law by Chercover, J. L. & Cock, D. G. M.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 2, Number 1 (April 1960) Article 2
The Tax Rentals-a Flaw in the Law
J. L. Chercover
D. G. M. Cock
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Chercover, J. L. and Cock, D. G. M.. "The Tax Rentals-a Flaw in the Law." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2.1 (1960) : 17-38.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol2/iss1/2
The Tax Rentals- A Flaw in the Law?
J. L. CHERCOVER and D. G. M. COCK
I THE AGREEMENTS
The Canadian citizen's existence is circumscribed by the bounds
of man-made laws which operate beneath the canopy of the con-
stitution. The fertile human mind has consistently rendered man
capable of overcoming laws, be they natural or man-made. It is
the scope of this article to examine the present Dominion-Provincial
"Tax-Rental" Agreements in relation to our Constitution, and with
regard to their effects on the individual citizen.
It becomes obvious at the outset that such a discussion neces-
sarily involves a consideration of a host of collateral issues which,
while of great interest to the student, cannot possibly be handled
in any manner short of a text on the subject. The authors must
therefore limit this work to a brief analysis of an expository nature
which will answer the question, "What are these Agreements?"
This will be followed by a discussion of the problems and history of
the questions, "What do the Agreements purport to do?" and "What
are their effects?" The interests of brevity require that no attempt
be made to delve into the background of the extraordinary financial
measures occasioned by the Wartime Tax Agreements, and their
position as progenitors of the present tax schemes.
Therefore, this work is limited to the effects of the agreements
on the parties and the individual citizen, the question of constitu-
tional validity, and the correlative subjects of historical development
of subsidies, the present-day subsidy structure, and the problem of
constitutional amendment.
Perhaps the most productive way of representing these agree-
ments is to summarize the provisions of a "typical" example. This
side-steps the difficulty of setting out all the differences among all
the contracts between each participating Province and the Domin-
ion.1 The document is in the form of a simple contract between
Canada (of the first part) and the Province (of the second). After
reciting the expiry of the Tax Rental Agreement 1952, and the
resolve of the parties to enter into a new Agreement under which
Messrs. Chercover and Cock are in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law
School.I The most important differences will be mentioned below. This article
deals with the set of Agreements signed in 1957 and presently operative in
all provinces but Quebec. Tax rental agreements of earlier years cannot be
dealt with in any detail here.
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Canada agrees to pay the amounts provided and the Province to
refrain from levying and collecting the taxes set out, and that the
Agreement shall not be deemed a surrender or abrogation by either
party of any of its powers, rights, etc., under the B.N.A. Act, the
Agreement provides:
(1) Covenant by Canada: that for the five fiscal years (ending
31st March, 1962) Canada will pay annually the amount
calculated in accordance with the Federal-Provincial Tax
Sharing Arrangements Act,2 the enabling legislation.
3
(2) Covenant by the Province: subject to further provisions4
the Province will not imposd or permit any municipality
to impose individual income taxes in respect of a five-year
period ending 31st December, 1961, corporation income
taxes and corporation taxes in respect of that period, or
succession duties in respect of the death of persons during
that period. The Province undertakes to ensure the above
and to suspend or cause to remain suspended all enactments
imposing the taxes above-mentioned5 and during the period
to refrain from bringing them into operation or to permit
imposition of new taxes of any kind which "would have the
effect of evading the true intent and purpose of this agree-
ment, which is ... to secure to Canada the sole occupancy
of the tax fields mentioned...."
(3) Natural Resources: notwithstanding Clause 2 above, the
Province may impose royalties and rentals on natural re-
sources and tax income derived from mining and logging
operations and during the period, Canada will allow these
royalties, rental and taxes to be deducted in computing
income under the Income Tax Act.7
(4) Manner and Time of Payments: The Minister of Finance
calculates the amount of the payment due to the Provinces
in respect of the several tax fields agreed upon by the
parties. Provision is made for instalment payments, re-
vision of the payments estimated by the Minister owing to
receipt of more accurate information, recalculation of pay-
ments made during a fiscal year after the close thereof and
2 4-5 Eliz. II, c. 29.
3 Ibid., See. 6 authorizes the Minister of Finance to enter into the agree-
ments on behalf of Canada. The compensation payable under the agree-
ments is provided for by Sec. 7: see infra, p. 22-3.
4 See especially clause 5, infra, p. 22-3.
5 Lists of these enactments appear in Appendices to the agreements.
6 Ontario is the only province which does not substantially conform with
the above description of the covenant by the Province. Ontario's undertaking
applies only to the Individual Income Taxes.
7 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 and amendments. This provision is uniform in all
the agreements.
8 These calculations are made according to the terms of the Federal-
Provincial Tax Arrangements Act, supra, footnote 2; see especially sec. 7.
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before the 31st day of December next following,9 payment
of any amount outstanding after recalculation to fully dis-
charge Canada's obligation or repayment by the Province
of such amount as has been overpaid according to the
recalculation, and finally a right of set-off for Canada in
respect to any such "refund" due from but unpaid by the
Province.
(5) Undertakings Re Certain Provincial Taxes: The Province
and Municipalities retain the right to collect the taxes of
the types covered in the agreements, the liability for which
arose prior to the time after which the Province agreed
not to impose such taxes.10 The Province may also levy
and collect succession duties respecting persons who died
before April 1, 1947.11 The Province is also permitted to
enact legislation imposing taxes covered by the agreement,
which enactments will take effect after termination (either
as limited by Clause 2 or Clause 10) and apply to income
earned or succession consequent upon death occurring after
such termination.
(6) Undertakings Re Equal Treatment of Provinces: If any
two Provinces object thereto, Canada agrees not to contract
to make payments to any third Province except as calcu-
lated under the relevant provisions of this agreement. The
Province has the right to demand, in the case of an agree-
ment with any other Province which differs from its own,
that its own agreement be amended to conform with such
other agreement. Canada further agrees to furnish the
Province with a copy of any proposed agreement with any
other province. Failure to object within 30 days is deemed
acceptance of the proposed agreement.
12
(7) Undertaking Re Calculation of Payments: The Minister of
Finance of Canada will notify the Province of any proposed
amendment to the Regulations under the Federal-Provincial
Tax Sharing Arrangements Act which would result in the
annual amount payable to the Province being less than if
calculated under that Act and Regulations as they stood
at the date of the Agreement. Canada may make such
amendment notwithstanding any objections, but must con-
9 Where recalculation cannot be made in this manner, then it is to be
made at a time subsequently agreed upon by the parties, i.e., succession
duties where applicable.
10 March 30, 1942, is the date for all provinces which signed the Wartime
Tax Agreement except Nova Scotia, which is November 30, 1942. In the
case of Newfoundland, it is the Tax Rental Agreement, March 29, 1950.
11 April 1, 1949, is the date for Newfoundland. Ontario has no similar
provision of course, since succession duties are not included in the Ontario
agreement: see supra, footnote 6.
12Further Provisions concerning the operation of this clause to the
adaptation of time periods, selection of enactments to be suspended, and
interpretation are omitted.
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tinue to pay the amount calculated in accordance with the
Act and Regulations as they stood when the Agreement was
signed. This is expressed not to affect the right of the
Minister of Finance of Canada to alter standard rates of
taxes or duty as provided by the Act.13
(8) Disputes and Differences: Where either party gives notice
in writing that in its opinion there is disagreement as to
interpretation or alleges contravention of any provision of
the agreement, the Province will within 60 days cause the
Lieutenant-Governor to refer the matter to the Court of
Appeal1 4 of the Province. Such reference is in the form of
a question for the opinion of the court in such terms as
agreed upon by the parties or determined by the Chief
Justice if they cannot agree. The reference shall include a
question as to what steps, if any, ought to be taken "to
place the parties in the position in which they would have
been, had there been no such contravention or failure".
It is provided that both parties shall take such steps neces-
sary to give effect to the opinion of the court and failure
to do so by either justifies the other party terminating the
agreement under Clause 10 forthwith.15
(9) Procedure on Reference: Procedure is governed by the
Rules of the Court of Appeal or as the court determines.
The parties agree to provide the court with such informa-
tion as it may require and to accept and be bound by its
opinion. Further, they agree to abide by the opinions of
the courts of other Provinces given under corresponding
Agreements insofar as they are applicable. The Province
agrees to give notice to Provinces with similar agreements
in order that they, too, may appear and be heard as if they
were parties to the reference. 16
(10) Termination After Reference: Notice to terminate (for fail-
ure to comply with the judgment on the reference) is to be
in writing between the Ministers of Finance1 7 of the parties
and such notice operates to terminate the obligation of the
Provinces with respect to income and corporation taxes
from the end of the calendar year, and with respect to
succession duties after the 1st of April in the calendar year
following that in which the notice is given. The obligations
of Canada are terminated regarding payments commencing
in the calendar year following that in which the notice is
13 Supra, footnote 2: see Sec. 2(3).
14 Or equivalent tribunal in the province in question.
15 Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is also provided for on all
such references.
_16Further provisions re parties bearing their own costs and each Prov-
ince enacting legislation necessary to give its court jurisdiction, provide for
appeals and hearing of other provinces on reference, have been omitted.
17 Or corresponding functionary in each province.
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given, and regarding permitting deduction of provincial taxes
on Natural Resources from computation of Income Tax,
from the calendar year following that in which the Notice
is given. All obligations mentioned above remain effective
until the time provided for their termination.
(11) Tax Deductions after Expiry: Unless the Province otherwise
agrees, Canada will allow deductions from income and cor-
poration taxes after December 31, 1961 and succession
duties consequent on deaths after April 1, 1962 at the same
rate as if the agreement had not been entered into.
(12) Saving Clause: Nothing in this agreement shall be deemed
to vary or terminate the rights or obligations of either
party under any other agreement, or their authority to
amend this one or enter into a new one.
There follows an exhaustive interpretation section and the Appen-
dices referred to in the Agreement. These agreements in form and
in principle are substantially similar to those of 1952 and would
appear to be the product of a trend in financing both Provinces and
Dominion by means of taxation. This historical development will be
dealt with below.' 8
Now, any one of the agreements, on its face, would appear
to be a simple contract within the powers of the parties and breach-
ing no constitutional rules. Section 92(2) of the B.N.A. Act19 con-
fers upon the provinces exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect
to "Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a
Revenue for Provincial Purposes", and one would conclude that a
province is within its rights to refrain from exercising this right
of taxation and to contract so to refrain. On the other hand, Parlia-
ment is assigned the power to legislate for "The Raising of Money
by any Mode or System of Taxation. '20 Therefore, since the agree-
ments expressly stipulate that there is no surrender or abandonment
of any powers by either party to be implied from the agreement,
2 1
thus ruling out the possibility of the province delegating its taxing
powers to the Dominion,2 it is clear that the taxes imposed by the
Dominion authorities fall under 91(3) and are in no way beyond
the competence of Parliament.
however, the vital point is that suspension of provincial rights
to a field of direct taxation, which would in fact net the province
little or no revenue, in return for a grant which is grossly dispro-
portionate to the possible revenue which might have been realized
18 Infra, p. 23 ff.
191867, 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3 and amendments.2 0 Ibid., sec. 91(3).
21 SUpra, p. 18.
22The powers of the Dominion and Province are plenary and absolute
within their respective legislative spheres and cannot be delegated one to
the other: see A.-G. Nova Scotia v. A.-G. Canada, [1951] S.C.R. 31; P.E.I.
Marketing Board v. A.-G. Canada, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392.
1960]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
by that province, begins to smack of a direct gift, Dominion to
Province. For example, consider the revenue given up by Ontario
in withdrawing from the field of personal income taxes, when com-
pared with that given up by New Brunswick in the same field.
23
With this in mind, one stops thinking in terms of "agreements"
and "tax rentals" and begins to think in terms of "equalization" and
"subsidies" to the financially weaker provinces at the expense of the
taxpayers in the stronger. The whole complexion of the problem
changes. If the apparently constitutional set of contracts is being
employed to bring about a result which, in pith and substance is an
equalization or subsidy scheme, then an attempt is being made to
circumvent the necessity of an amendment to the B.N.A. Act.
2 4
Basically, the Agreements provide that the Provinces will
receive
(a) 9% Allowance on Corporations tax.25
(b) 10% of the total amount payable by individuals in the Province
under the Income Tax Act, but not including the tax levied by see.
10(3) of the Old Age Security Act.26
(c) 50% of the total amount payable under the Dominion Succession
Duty Act.27
So far, so good. The structure appears to be a straight rental
of taxation functions, and no questions could be raised as to the
validity of such payments. However, the payments do not cease
here, and one other important section must be mentioned.
Section 3(1) (a) 28 provides that payment may be made to the
Province of a "tax equalization. payment". The method of computa-
tion is outlined in Section 429 of the Act. Here is a simple explana-
tion of its operation:
Assume that New Brunswick's revenues outlined above are
added together. The sum thus obtained shall be called "x". Now
let us take the total returns from the two provinces from whom
the per capita tax returns are greatest and total them to obtain
a sum which we will call "T". Dividing this by the total population
of the two provinces gives us a figure which we shall call "Y".
23 This is merely one example of the inequity produced by agreements
designed expressly to "establish a more equitable system of taxation through-
out Canada". Many other obvious examples come to mind, e.g., the exemp.
tion with respect to taxation of Natural Resources is of greater value to
some provinces than others.
24 Supra, footnote 19.
25 Supra, footnote 2, secs. 2(d) and 7(1) (b).
26 Ibid., sees 2(f) and 7(1) (a).





Returns from the two Provinces
Population of those two Provinces -
T
expressed as - = Y
P
We are now ready to present the formula for the additional pay-
ment to New Brunswick, the "tax equalization payment", which we
will call "E".30
Y=E+x .. E=Y-x
Pop. of N.B. Pop. of N.B.
It is evident from this formula that a weaker province is getting a
payment designed to equalize its returns with the level of the
wealthier provinces. This is a Parliamentary way of describing an
outright subsidy.
II SUBSIDIES
In order to evaluate properly the implications of the finding
that the Tax Rental Agreements appear to be a guise for subsidies,
it is necessary to gain some understanding of the subsidy structure
under the Constitution. It is impossible to achieve this without
examining the historical background. A brief coverage of the more
important events in the stormy record should serve to throw the
anomalies of the situation into clear focus.
Any analysis of the problem must go back to the Quebec Con-
ference of 1864. The American Civil War was no longer in doubt,
but citizens of the British North American Colonies had severe
qualms whenever they thought of what the northern army might
do after it had finished crushing the rebels. The concept of "Mani-
fest Destiny" was more than just a political cry in the bourgeoning
United States, and no decade had gone by since the War of 1812-14
in which some American politician had not expressed the view that
conquest of the British Colonies was inevitable.3 ' Internecine prob-
lems and expansion to the South and West had heretofore prevented
these threats from being realized, but the spectre of the mightiest
army assembled in history had fundamentally altered the picture.
32
30 Ibid., see. 4.
31 For example, President Polk had been elected on the chauvinistic
platform of "54'40 or Fight!"
32 Donald G. Creighton: John A. MacdonaZd, Toronto, 1952; 1-358.
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The border raids33 had a particularly strong effect on the Mari-
timers who had previously lived in snobbish, if not splendid, isola-
tion from the Province of Canada, a troubled union of present-day
Ontario and Quebec.34 Unionist sentiment thus began to develop,
although a few dissenting voices were raised when the idea of union
for strength was first mooted; Joseph Howe, the colourful Nova
Scotian, had sneered at the "mighty" army that might be assembled
by the unified Colonies; after totalling up the number of men avail-
able for fighting, he pictured them spread across the thousands of
miles of American boundary-a single thin red line of stalwarts
"only 37 yards apart, (who) may occasionally catch a glimpse of
each other where the country is not thickly wooded." 35
The impetus towards Confederation had come from Canada with
its miserable political deadlock.36 The leading proponent was a man
blessed with a genuine vision (not in the modern connotation) of a
unified North American power. John A. Macdonald was thus ready
to capitalize on Maritime worries about the Americans; he pressed
unity of the Colonies and pointed scornfully to the Civil War as an
inevitable result of strong States power, urging Legislative Union
as a remedy to such fatal federalism.3 7
Although his plan for Legislative Union was early scuttled, he
had succeeded in influencing many of the Canadian delegates to the
Quebec Conference in this direction. Sir Alexander Galt's opening
address on the morning of October 10 is illustrative of the strongly
centralist view:3 8
Provision must be made for the Local Governments. All the revenues
from Customs and Excise would go to the General Government. The
expenses of the Local Government would be lessened by the works they
now have to provide being lessened.
There are two ideas implicit in this statement: the first is that
the "Local Governments" are viewed as distinctly inferior to the
"General Government", rather like Municipal Councils; the second
is that it is blandly assumed that a removal of the chief source of
revenue from all the Colonies will produce equal effects. It should
be realized that at this time Customs Revenue was the source of
well over half Colonial Revenues.3 9
33 The incident in St. Stephen's, N.B., was a particularly notorious
exam le.
The union had taken place during the governorship of Lord Sydenham,
and was based on the recommendations in Lord Durham's famous Report.3 5 The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe: Joseph Chisholm
ed., Halifax, 1909, II, 486.36 Supra, see footnote 32, pp. 323-350.
37Ibid., p. 351.
38No minutes were kept of the Conference. This is a report by A. A.
Macdonald, Prince Edward Island delegate. See Canadian Historical Review,
March, 1920, at p. 30, A. G. Doughty ed., "Notes on the Quebec Conference".
39The figures for 1866 are as follows: Customs revenue formed 60% of
Canadian revenue, 80% of Nova Scotia's, 78% of New Brunswick's, and 75%
of Prince Edward Island's. See "British North America at Confederation",
Appendix 2, Rowell-Sirois Report; Donald G. Creighton, Ottawa, 1939, 72.
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Galt had it quickly brought home to him that the reduction in
revenues would not be equally compensated by a decline in expendi-
tures. The Maritime Governments were spending far more on roads,
docks, and schools than were the Canadians40 who generally left
such outlays in the hands of the municipalities. Under the original
Canadian proposal, the new Federal Government would have assumed
77% of the existing expenses of the Canadas as against only 45% of
those of Nova Scotia, 49% of New Brunswick and 28% of Prince
Edward Island.4 Brown and Gait urged the Maritimers to foist
many of these responsibilities on the shoulders of their municipalities
but were signally unsuccessful.
It thus became obvious that some form of handout, which must
be euphemistically termed an equalization measure, was necessary
if the union of Forest and Sea was to be consummated. Subsidies
were agreed on.
The first was the simple 800 per capita annual grant. In retro-
spect this sum chosen was unfortunate, since it allowed that efficient
propagandist, Joseph Howe, a chance to harangue his legion of
Nova Scotian worshippers with the slogan "that Nova Scotia has
been sold for the price of a sheepskin."
42
It had been promptly agreed that the Federal Government was
to assume all Colonial debts. The equalization medium, so that the
profligate would not be rewarded at the expense of the thrifty, was
the debt allowance. If a colony had less than $25 debt per capita,
it received 5% annually on the difference. If it had greater debts,
then the Dominion was to receive 5% on the excess annually.
43
This had the superficial appearance of equalization, but, as
Tupper pointed out, the Maritimes' debt was largely accumulated
in building railways, so they had distinct assets to hand over to
the Federal Government.44 In Canada, the railways were largely
privately owned, but liberally aided by Government subsidies. 45
Exceptional grants were agreed upon, but only after bitter
wrangling. New Brunswick received $63,000 per annum in order
to balance her budget.46. Newfoundland was promised $150,000 annu-
ally in compensation for her public lands.47 These concessions were
only wrung out of the Canadians after bitter debate; furthermore,
the Canadians only relented on the basis that such special grants
40Per Capita Expenditures for 1866: Canada, $.46 and $.35 for Public
Welfare and Education; Nova Scotia, $1.58 and $.71, respectively; New
Brunswick, $.85 and $.59 respectively. Ibid., 66.
41James Ackley Maxvell: Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Govern-
ments in Canada, Cambridge, 1937; 7.
42 J. W. Longley: Sir Charles Tupper, Toronto, 1916; 71.
43 British North America Act, 1867, s. 112, 114, 115-116; also see supra,
footnote 41, pp. 9-11.44 Supra, see footnote 41: 11. Also see Canadian Confederation Debates,
Ottawa, 1951: 94.45 Supra, see footnote 41: 11.
46 British North America Act, supra, fdotnote 19, s. 119.
47 Supra, see footnote 41: 13.
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merely equalized the subsidy payments to the Provinces. It is hard
for an observer today to appreciate how important this principle
of equality of treatment was to men of the day.48 . Even the Mari-
time delegates who fought for the concessions seemed to agree with
this fundamental ideal in the drafting of the Confederation Resolu-
tions. No conception of levelling out the economies of the respective
Provinces seems to have occurred to them. Equality of treatment
from the Central Government was to be the byword of the Union.
It was on this very point that the Resolutions were unfairly
beneficial to the Canadas at the expense of the Maritimes that
opposition struck. Premier Tilley of New Brunswick decided to do
the honourable thing (in spite of Tupper's pleas), and was roundly
trounced in an election on the issue.49 Dr. Tupper thoughtfully post-
poned any test of strength in Nova Scotia.50 Prince Edward Island
had effectively withdrawn from the discussions after the first day
of the Conference, and her rejection of Confederation was never in
doubt.51
As a result of strong pressure from the Colonial Office, the
Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick was instrumental in achiev-
ing a speedy dissolution, and after a heated campaign in which
loyalty to the British connection was named as the central issue,
the electors of New Brunswick gave Tilley his mandate.5 2
As a result of the lengthy agitation in the Maritimes, further
subsidies were inserted at London, and on July 1, 1867, the Marriage,
however morganatic the Maritimers may have considered it, was
proclaimed.
The honeymoon was scarcely over before articulate Nova Scotian
opposition began to make itself felt. It was forcefully pointed out
that Confederation had taken away 90% of the Province's revenues,
but only 55% of its expenses.5 3 Joseph Howe was rebuffed when
he went to London to try to remove Nova Scotia from Confederation,
even though he had just won an overwhelming victory over the
unionists in the election. However, it was obvious to Macdonald that
something had to be done.
The "something" arrived at was an inducement to the aging
Nova Scotian hero. If the financial terms could be settled equitably,
then, as symbol of the end of strife and the beginning of a glorious
era of partnership in forging a new nation, Mr. Howe could join
the Federal Cabinet. The daring of this idea may be more fully
appreciated if one considers the possibility that Mr. St. Laurent
4sCanadian Confederation Debates, pp. 92-94, where George Brown out-
lines the viewpoint.49 Supra, see footnote 32: 399.50 R. G. Trotter: Canadian Federation, London, 1924: 125.
51 See Duncan Campbell, The History of Prince Edward Island, Char-
lottetown, 1875, for a complete discussion.52James Hannay: History of New Brunswick, St. John, 1909: 247-255.
53 Supra, see footnote 41: 27.
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ever had of inducing Mr. Duplessis to forget the past and join his
Federal Cabinet. The analogy, it is submitted, is fair. Historians
have debated ever since the sudden capitulation of the grand old
man, but the most likely explanation is that he saw that these terms
were too favourable to reject.
5 4
Having determined on this course, there remained only the
problem of justifying special treatment of Nova Scotia, because the
Grits of George Brown would inevitably be wrathful at any further
grants, the conception of strictly equal treatment being deeply im-
bedded in the minds of the Upper Canadians.
The "precedent" was found in the special grant to New Bruns-
wick of $63,000 per annum which had been incorporated into section
119 of the British North America Act. After some mathematics and
negotiation, it was decided to grant Nova Scotia $82,698 per annum
as an additional subsidy to rectify the injustice.5 5 The historic
"Better Terms" agitation of Nova Scotia had succeeded.
There remained only the small matter of passing the Bill through
the Federal Parliament. On June 11, 1869, the day after revised
offers to Newfoundland had been approved, Mr. Rose moved, second-
ed by Sir John Macdonald, that the House resolve itself into com-
mittee to consider "certain proposed resolutions relative to the
affairs of the Province of Nova Scotia.
'5 6
Edward Blake rose to move an amendment, which was seconded
by Mr. Mackenzie. Instantly the opposition to the plan acquired a
new character. Instead of opposing the resolution on the mere
ground that additional subsidies were unfair, Mr. Blake confronted
the Government with a thorny problem: Was any revision of the
subsidy structure constitutional? Blake's amendment was as follows:
57
That all the words after "that" to the end of the question be left
out, and the words "the British North America Act, 1867, has fixed and
settled the mutual liabilities of Canada and of each Province in respect
of the public debt, and the amount payable by Canada for the support
of its Government and Legislature;
"That the said Act does not empower the Parliament of Canada to
change the basis of Union thereby affixed and settled; That the un-
authorized assumption of such power by the Parliament of Canada would
imperil the interests of the several Provinces, weaken the bond of
Union, and shake the stability of the Constitution;
"That the proposed Resolutions on the subject of Nova Scotia
involve the assumption of such power.
54Supra, see footnote 35, H, 584-6. These are Howe's own reasons, as
given in an address to the electors of Hants. For a discussion of the events
from Macdonald's point of view see Donald G. Creighton: John A. Macdon-
ald, Toronto, 1955, 11, 16-22. This policy has been called "striking off the
tallest heads." See J. Murray Beck: The Government of Nova Scotia,
Toronto, 1957: 152.
55R. MacGregor Dawson: The Government of Canada, Toronto, 1954:
120. Also the statute: 32-33 Vict., c. 2.
56 Journals of the House of Commons, 1869.
57 Ibid., p. 232.
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"And that therefore this House, while ready to give its best con-
sideration to any proposals to procure in a constitutional way any
needed changes in the basis of Union, deems it inexpedient to go into
Committee on the said proposed Resolutions", inserted instead thereof.
(Italics are ours.)
Section 118 of the British North America Act had outlined the
sums payable to the Provinces and included the words "Such grants
shall be in full settlement of all future demands on Canada". Ad-
mittedly, these words were superfluous for Blake's purpose, because
the very fact that the sums were named meant, he felt, that
revision, upwards or downwards constituted a power beyond the
competence of the Federal Parliament. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
Sir John's fund of political shrewdness was equal to the occa-
sion. Ignoring Blake's thoughtful constitutional argument, and Mac-
kenzie's quiet logic, he launched into a blistering indictment of
Mackenzie, saying that he had at last revealed his true colours as
a secret plotter against Confederation.58 He rephrased the issue to
a somewhat simpler question: those who are loyal to Canada and
the Queen will vote against the amendment, those who still try to
destroy Her Majesty's Union will vote for it.
The Globe came out with a three column editorial on June 15,
headed, "The Constitution in Danger", which contained some pro-
phetic passages. The following excerpts from the lengthy criticism
of the Government's stand may be cited.59
The doctrine promulgated by the Ministers in this debate . .. throws
wide open the door of the Federal Treasury to the plotting promoters
of every scheme, delusive or otherwise, for purely local purposes. It
proclaims a new era of jobbery and log-rolling, and strikes, we deeply
regret to believe, a deadly blow at the future peace and prosperity of
the Dominion. The effect of the vote is to destroy the federal character
of the union, and restore that system, with all its demoralizations, from
which the people of Upper Canada were so rejoiced to believe they had
forever escaped. The power arrogated to itself by the Ottawa legisla-
ture in this vote sets at defiance the fundamental principles of the
Imperial Constitutional Act (i.e., the B.N.A. Act)-namely, that the
people of each province shall have exclusive control over their own
affairs, that the revenues of the General Government shall be applied
to general purposes only, and that beyond the sums specially stipulated
to be paid "in full settlement of all future demands upon the General
Government for local purposes", the whole burden of Provincial expendi-
ture shall be borne from exclusively local revenues. If the Ottawa
legislature has the power to do this thing, then is the Imperial Act of
1867 a delusion and a snare,-for it affords no protection against injus-
tices to the several provinces that were induced to join Confederation
on the basis of its provisions. . . Let the precedent which this Act
involves be once established and there is no limit to the demands that
may be made upon the Dominion by the Provinces. Let it once be
admitted that the financial provisions contained in the Union Act may
be set aside by a mere Parliamentary majority, and we shall never be
done with Provincial raids upon the Dominion Treasury. (Italics are ours.)
The day previous, Blake had risen again in the House to review
the arguments on the issue. Ignoring the political fogging, he dealt
58 The Globe, June 14, 1869.
59 Ibid., June 15.
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specifically with the only constitutional defence that had been raised,
namely that the Federal Government could do as it liked with its
own money: 6
0
Has the Legislature of Ontario the power to do what it liked with its
own money? Has it the right to subsidize the judges of the Superior
Courts with its own money? Has it the right to provide for services
which the Imperial Act provided should be paid for by the Parliament
of Canada? No; it might fling its money into the lake if it liked, but
it could not divert any of it into a channel which was within the juris-
diction of this Parliament.
In spite of further amendment attempts, the Bill carried. How-
ever, Blake, who was also a member of the Ontario legislature, did
not give up the cause. He moved an address to the Queen in the
Ontario legislature, which was transmitted to Joseph Howe, by now
Secretary of State for the Provinces in Macdonald's Cabinet. It is a
lengthy review of the financial background to the subsidy provisions,
but the following sections are interesting: 61
7. That the financial arrangements made by the Union Act, as
between Canada and the several Provinces, cannot, and ought not, to
be changed by the Parliament of Canada.
8. That the financial arrangements made by the Union Act, as
between Canada and the several Provinces, ought not to be changed
without the assent of the several Provinces.
9. That the Parliament of Canada, at its last session, passed an
Act, whereby the amount of debt, at which Nova Scotia entered the
Union, was increased by $1,188,756, and her subsidy was increased by
an annual payment of $82,698 for ten years, making altogether, an
alteration in favour of that Province of over $2,000,000, of which Ontario
pays over $1,100,000.
12. That an humble address be presented to Her Most Gracious
Majesty, embodying the foregoing resolutions, and praying that she will
be pleased to disallow the said Act.
This was referred to Macdonald, who transmitted it to the Secre-
tary for the Colonies. In reading the correspondence that went on
during that year, an interesting anomaly becomes apparent: 62
The Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General.
Downing Street, 23rd August, 1869.
Sir,-As I observed that a doubt was entertained during the passing of
the Act "respecting Nova Scotia" . . . whether it was competent for
the Legislature of Canada to pass such a measure, I thought it desirable
to take the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown upon the point and
I have been advised that it was competent for the Parliament of Canada
to pass under powers vested in it by the 31st section of the British
North America Act, 1867. I have, &c.,
Granville.
In the letter from the Governor-General to the Secretary of
State, dated January 11th, 1870, the last sentence of the above letter
is quoted verbatim, including the key words "by the 31st section of
the British North America Act, 1867. ,, 63
60 Ibid., June 15.
61 Sessional Papers, 1869, No. 25.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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Yet, in a letter dated January 5th, 1870, from Sir John Mac-
donald to the Governor-General of Canada, we find the following
statement: 64
That opinion was conveyed to your Excellency by Lord Granville's
despatch, dated the 23rd of August last, and was, shortly, that the Act
was one which it was competent for the Parliament of Canada, to pass
under the powers vested in it by the 71st section of the British North
America Act, 1867.
The difference in authorities cited for the action is itself quite
fascinating, but confusion is deepened when one considers the two
sections of the British North America Act that are cited with such
assurance. Section 31 of the Act is the Section that outlines the
modes by which the place of a Senator may become vacant, including
treason and if a Senator is "convicted of Felony or any infamous
crime". 65 Section 71 is imbued with a similar lack of relevance: it
described the bicameral composition of the Legislature of the Prov-
ince of Quebec. 66 The "Law Officers of the Crown", of course are
the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General. Their opinion serves to
shed no light on the problem whatever. Could it be that they were
unable to discover a proper Constitutional authority?
It is more likely that the Law Officers of the Crown intended to
cite sec. 91. The next problem which arises concerns what parts of
sec. 91 they might have meant. The following possibilities are con-
ceivable. First, the "peace, order and good government" clause would
seem to be the most likely authority. It must not be forgotten that at
this time the clause was viewed as the wide residual power which
the Fathers of Confederation had no doubt intended it to be. Al-
though Russell v. Queen67 was eleven years away, it is illustrative
of the tenor of opinion. However, even without arguing the obvious
fact that the Russell case was severely abridged by subsequent
64 Ibid.
65 The Place of a Senator shall become vacant in any of the following
cases:
(1) If for two consecutive sessions of the Parliament he fails to give his
attendance in the Senate;
(2) If he takes an Oath or makes a declaration or Acknowledgment
of Allegiance, Obedience, or Adherence to a Foreign Power, or does
an Act whereby he becomes a Subject or Citizen, or entitled to the
rights or privileges of a Subject or Citizen of a Foreign Power;
(3) If he is adjudged Bankrupt or insolvent, or applies for the Benefit
of any Law relating to insolvent debtors, or becomes a public
defaulter;
(4) If he is attainted of treason or convicted of Felony or of any infam.
ous crime;
(5) If he ceases to be qualified in respect of Property or of Residence;
provided, that a Senator shall not be deemed to have ceased to be
qualified in respect of Residence by reason only of his residing at
the Seat of the Government of Canada while holding an Office under
that Government requiring his presence there.
66 There shall be a Legislature for Quebec consisting of the Lieutenant-
Governor and of Two Houses, styled the Legislative Council of Quebec and
the Legislative Assembly of Quebec.
67 (1881) 7 App. Cas. 829.
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decisions of the Judicial Committee,68 it would appear that the
residual power may not be relied upon in support of legislation of
"a merely local or private nature". 69
Secondly, sec. 91(1)70 "public debt and property", might have
been considered. There are strong arguments against this view. The
use of the word "public" clearly differentiates such legislation from
provincial debt allowances, referring as it does to the national body
politic of Canada. This section is the result of the decision at the
Quebec Conference that the new nation would assume provincial
debts. Nor can the word "property" be relied on, for it is submitted
that this word must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding
phrase "public debt" which we have shown to refer to matters
national in scope.
More properly it would seem that the law officers should have
referred to the provisions of the B.N.A. Act authorizing the appro-
priation of moneys. Section 102 of the B.N.A. Act provides:
All Duties and Revenues over which the respective Legislatures of
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick before and at the Union had
and have Power of Appropriation, except such Portions thereof as are
by this Act reserved to the respective Legislatures of the Provinces, or
are raised by them in accordance with the special Powers conferred on
them by this Act, shall form One Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be
appropriated for the Public Service of Canada in the manner and subject
to the Charges in this Act provided.
Sections 103-105 charge the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada
with certain charges. Section 106 then provides:
Subject to the several Payments by this Act charged on the Consolidated
Revenue Fund of Canada, the same shall be appropriated by the Parlia-
ment of Canada for the Public Service.
The Provincial power of appropriation is provided by Section 126:
Such Portions of the Duties and Revenues over which the respective
Legislatures of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick had before
the Union Power of Appropriation as are by this Act reserved to the
respective Governments or Legislatures of the Provinces, and all Duties
and Revenues raised by them in accordance with the special Powers
conferred upon them by this Act, shall in each Province form One Con-
solidated Revenue Fund to be appropriated for the Public Service of
the Province.
There is a curious omission from these sections in relation to
the Government of Canada. No reference is made to revenues to
be raised by Canada under the special powers conferred on it.
Possibly the power of appropriation was intended to be covered by
"Public Debt and Property" in Section 91. More probably, it would
seem that Section 106 is the general power of appropriation by
Parliament.
If this is the case, there are strong grounds for arguing that
Section 118 as originally enacted prescribing the subsidy settlements
68Fort Francis v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695. See also
Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snyder, [1925] A.C. 396.6 9 See sup-ra, footnote 19, sec. 91, concluding paragraph.
7ONow sec. 91(1)A.
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with the Provinces as being "in full settlement of all future demands
on Canada" would be an implied restriction on the power of appro-
priation for the public service of Canada.
Moreover, the exclusive power of the Province to impose "Direct
Taxation within the Province in Order to the Raising of the Revenue
for Provincial Purposes", conferred by head 2 of Section 92, im-
plicity restricts the Federal Parliament from raising money by direct
taxation in order to pay moneys to the Provinces for provincial
purposes.
A substantial argument against these views is that "Public
Services of Canada" in Section 106 could be construed to include
payments made to the Provinces to advance national purposes. The
1942 taxation agreements were based on a desire to permit the
Federal Government to impose a one hundred per cent excess profit
tax to control profiteering during wartime. In order to achieve
this end, it was necessary for the Provinces to refrain from taxa-
tion in the chosen fields, or the Dominion would have to provide
alternative revenues. The 1947 taxation agreements are based on
a different philosophy, namely, the Keynesian view that taxation is
not only a matter of revenue, but also a weapon of fiscal policy.
National purposes, therefore, require complete freedom in the econ-
omically dynamic fields of income and corporation taxes to permit
a national fiscal policy. This argument should not prevail over
legislative restrictions in the Act, and the expression "Public Ser-
vices of Canada" read in the light of the subsidy settlements and
the exclusive provincial power of taxation in Section 92(2) would
seem to have been limited from the outset.
To return to the historical analysis which was being consid-
ered above, if Macdonald did not have the constitution on his side,
he had something of almost equal value: politics. By the time the
above correspondence was placed before the House of Commons in
the Sessional Papers, an election was near. The retirement from the
House of Joseph Howe meant that a fertile field for Liberal votes
would probably be found in Nova Scotia. Under the circumstances,
with the solid Quebec vote for the Tories being already accepted as
inevitable, then Liberal hopes would seem to be centred on Southern
Ontario and the Maritimes. Blake and Mackenzie dared press the
issue no further. They had already lost support by their stand in
1869 and so they were impotent to challenge the Government on its
manoeuvres.
Why was this issue not raised when the Liberals took power
after the Pacific Scandals? The answer lies in the fact that they
did not dare to upset a system which was due to expire within three
years anyway. Blake had sought to pass a Bill declaring that the
Nova Scotia revision was the last that would ever come along, but
he had been unsuccessful.
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Furthermore, the tide was turning in Upper Canada. People
were beginning to realize that Provincial revenues were inadequate
and the cry soon became "Greater Subsidies". The longest depres-
sion in modern history had hit Upper Canada with a vengeance,
while not damaging the Maritimes quite as severely.71 Politics and
economics had become more important than the Constitution, and
each passing year seemed to hallow the Act more. What seemed
atrociously illegal in 1869 had become accepted practice ten years
later.
In addition, special treatment was now the rule, rather than a
grimly swallowed exception. When Manitoba joined Confederation
in 1870, she was granted terms that appeared roughly equal to
those granted the original members: 80¢ per capita annual subsidy,
debt allowance of $27.77 per head, and the annual grant for the
legislature.72 However, the population for the purpose of these
grants was assumed to be 17,000, whereas it was really 12,200, of
whom only 1,600 were white.73 Since she had no debt, this meant
a return on her debt allowance of $23,604 annually. The Legislative
Grant was $67,204, which amounted to more than eight times as
much per capita as Ontario was getting, and four times as much
as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.74 Manitoba ceded her Public
Lands to the Dominion, because the route of the Canadian Pacific
Railway had not been settled.
75
British Columbia in 1871 received a debt allowance of $27.77
per capita on a population named at 60,000,76 while it in reality was
only 34,000, of whom only 9,000 had political rights.77 An amount
of $100,000 was granted in perpetuity in return, allegedly, for a
strip of land twenty miles wide on each side of the C.P.R.78
Prince Edward Island had rebuffed all attempts at Union, but
an over-sanguine railway budget pushed the tiny colony to the verge
of bankruptcy. With an air of condescension, she joined the Union
in return for a debt allowance of $50 a head or $4,701,050, $45,000
annually in regard to absentee landlords, the eighty cent per capita
grant, and a Government grant of $30,000.79
When Saskatchewan and Alberta joined in 1905, they gave up
their natural resources in return for grants which now amount to
71 Carl Wittke: A History of Canada, Toronto, 1935: 214-219. Also see
Creighton, supra, footnote 54, II, 208-209. For Nova Scotia's problem with
regard to decline of wood ship-building, see Creighton, supra, II, 452.
72 33 Vict., c. 3, ss. 23-25.
7 3 See supra, footnote 55: 119.
74 Supra, see footnote 41: 34.
75 Ibid., p. 36.
7 6 See Order in Council, April 5, 1871, I XXXVI and also at I XXXVIII.
7 7 Supra, see footnote 55: 119. The rest were Indians and Orientals.
78 Supra, see footnote 41: 40.
79 Ibid., pp. 41-50. Also see Order in Council, June 26, 1873, 36 and 37
Vict., IX, particularly at p. X.
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$750,000 per annum.8 0 The resources were returned in 1930, but
the payments have been increased, not eliminated.8 1
When Newfoundland joined in 1949, she received the ordinary
grants, and an additional subsidy of $1,100,000 per year.8 2
Other subsidies have been granted from time to time. New
Brunswick was granted $150,000 for repeal of export duties on
lumber, and this carries on.8
3
It would thus appear that the Globe's fears have been realized,
because, in special grants alone in 1957, (the latest year for which
figures are available) $6,081,000 was dispensed from the Federal
Treasury.
8 4
When it is considered that most of these moneys were disbursed
as a result of legislation passed in the same way as the original
"better terms" granted Nova Scotia in 1869, grave doubts may well
be entertained as to the authority for the payment of such large
sums. Naturally, those sums named in the Acts admitting new
Provinces to the Union are constitutional, because such Acts form
part of the Constitution under section 146 of the British North
America Act.8 5
However, the large sums that are still being granted constitute,
it is submitted, an infringement of the Constitution. The sections
of the Constitution are explicit as to the amounts to be granted,
and admit of no discretion. It is specious to argue that these are
mere minima, because there are no words anywhere in the Act
that suggest this interpretation. The repeal of section 118, which
includes the words "full settlement" does not alter the sections
which remain.86 Although zealous politicians have attempted to
bury them, the bars to subsidy revision seen by Blake stand un-
relenting.
II THE DEBT PROBLEM
The sad part about this system is not just that it is unconsti-
tutional, but that it is inadequate. Although 24.9% of Provincial
8 0 For Alberta see 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3. For Saskatchewan, see 4-5 Edw. VII,
c. 42.
83 Supra, see footnote 55: 120.
8213 Geo. VI, c. 1, particularly s. 26(b). Note that Newfoundland was
offered $150,000 annually in 1864. See supra, footnote 47. Such are the
ravages of inflation.8 3s upra, see footnote 55: 120.
84 Canada Year Book 1957: 1103.85 This section notes the names of the specific Provinces-to-be.86 Repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 14 Geo. VI, c. 6 (U.K.).
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revenues in 1955 came from Federal subsidies and Tax Rental
Agreements, this did not stem the tide of Provincial indebtedness.
8 7
One weakness, of course, of the present system is that the
equalization method used under the Agreements is grotesque in
that Alberta is receiving tax dollars from Ontario because of her
"poverty". In view of the fact that Alberta is able to pay dividends
to its citizens while Ontario is burdened with one of the highest
debt loads on the continent, it is apparent that a revision of the
formulas used is in order.
The clearest indication that a radical overhaul of the system is
needed may be seen by comparing the debt per capita figures: 8 8
1947 1956
O n tario ................................................................................... 175 370
New Brunswick .................. 208 348
Alberta .................... 185 75
Canada (Federal Government) .................... 1009 701
These figures show that even with the large handouts, which
we have shown to be at best of doubtful constitutionality, the Prov-
inces other than Alberta are going deeper into debt while the Federal
Government in the same period was cutting its debt.
Thus it is seen that even sacrificing constitutionality for expedi-
ence has failed to halt the serious inroads being made on Provincial
resources by swelling expenditures. Nor is there reason to believe
that further subsidies or equalization in the guise of tax-rental
agreements will change this tendency which has developed since
Confederation was but two years old. As long as our prosperity holds
out, the day of reckoning can be postponed. However, the huge
amount of borrowing that is being carried out has the inevitable
effect of raising costs for everyone else, particularly municipalities. 89
A solution within the terms of the British North America Act
must be found. If there seems to be no way out, then let us amend
it, not defy it.
IV THE PROBLEM OF AMENDMENT
The writers take no issue with the fact that the Tax-Sharing
arrangements may be extremely beneficial to Canada and the several
87 Total Provincial Revenues: $1,414,828. Payments under Tax Rental
Agreements totalled $327,954,000, and subsidies were $24,358,000. Supra, see
footnote 80: 1108.88 Supra, see footnote 84: 1111.
89 Municipalities and small businesses are particularly hampered due to
high interest rates.
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provinces but it is submitted that this does not justify the use of
unconstitutional expedients.90 The subsidies provisions of the B.N.A.
Act are clear9 ' and any change or alteration will necessarily require
amendment. Here is the crux of the problem. The question of
amendment to the B.N.A. Act has been faced with mixed success
in the past, and consequently, rather than meet the siuation squarely,
schemes are devised to get around it. It is submitted that such an
attitude leads to mistrust and the chaos of an unamendable Con-
stitution. Some way must be found of resolving the different inter-
ests involved and developing a comprehensive amending procedure.
The use of expedients to avoid the thorny issue will merely add to
the morass of confusion born of the conflict between "centralists"
and exponents of the "compact theory".
In form, only the British Parliament can amend the B.N.A. Act,
a statute of the Imperial Parliament. It is clear that since the
statute of Westminster,9 2 the Imperial authorities will grant any
amendment in response to a proper request.
However, no one knows what constitutes a "proper request".
There is no question that the Fathers of Confederation envisaged
a strong central government,93 and the advocates of this position
maintain that the federal government and only the federal govern-
ment possesses the amending power. However, a majority of political
leaders contend that unanimous consent of the Provinces is required
and if the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
are any indication, it would appear that the Imperial authorities
favour this view. Thus we have not a legal, but a political problem
causing the stalemate and forcing the use of such expedients as
Tax Agreements rather than such obviously preferable solution as
that in the Rowell-Sirois report outlined below. Attempts have been
made to divide the various sections of the B.N.A. Act into categories
and agree on an amending procedure for each 94 but the result was
deadlock over the actual distribution of powers between the two
levels of government. No agreement could be reached on a procedure
for amending this most fundamental portion of the Constitution,
and there the issue stands. It would be unfair to contend that the
individuals involved in the conferences which considered the problem
exhibited political immaturity or selfishness in any degree. They
90 See P.. v. Eastern Terminals, [1925) S.C.R. 434, especially per Atkin
L.J., and Natural Products Marketing Act case, [1937) 1 D.L.R. 691, A.C. 377.
91 Supra, footnote 19, see. 118, repealed by Statute Law Revision Act,
1950, 14 Geo. VI, c. 6. This is the famous "80 cents per head" subsidy
referred to above which had been rendered obsolete by the 1907 amendment,
7 Edw. VII, c. 11, which set out a system of grants according to population.
It must be clearly understood that since these subsidies are expressed in
terms in the B.N.A. Act, any variation thereof means amendment, and If,
as is submitted here, the tax agreements are in part, at least, subsidies, they
are unconstitutional as explained supra.
92 21 and 22 Geo. V.
93 upra, p. 24 ff.
94 F reproduction of these categories, nd the conferences generally,
see Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, pp. 23, 24.
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brought to their deliberations sincerity and vigour, and stood with
deep conviction for their respective points of view. However, their
inability to agree caanot be excused since it presents to Canada and
her citizens a legacy of monumental constitutional inadequacy.
In the realm of financial relations the upshot of the amendment
issue is the agreements here dealt with. The magnificent Rowell-
Sirois Report tabled in the House of Commons in 1939 had recom-
mended that the principal direct taxes should be given over
permanently and exclusively to the federal government. This would
bar the provinces from the three basic fields of taxation covered
above, in return for regular payments which would reflect their
fiscal needs and emergency grants in times of stress.95 However, all
this would require amendment to the B.N.A. Act. The intervention
of World War H1 and the virtual impossibility of amendment in any
case gave rise to financial conditions resulting in the negotiation of
the first set of agreements. 96
V CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that the judgment of Manson J. in Alworth
Jr. v. A.-G. British Columbia97 weakens the basic proposition of this
article, viz.: that the validity of the agreements is questionable on
constitutional grounds. This case dealt with the situation in which
the B.C. authorities purported unsuccessfully to tax a non-resident
under the Logging Tax Act,98 passed under a Natural Resources
clause similar to that reproduced in the "typical agreement" above,
clause 3. This case in no way refutes the authors' contention merely
because the court considers the agreements. On the contrary, the
learned judge expressly leaves the question of their validity wide
open, saying: 99
Assuming that the Dominion and the Province have the power to enter
into the series of agreements with regard to taxation which they did,
as to which I express no opinion.... (Italics are ours.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the learned judge simply assumed the
validity of the agreements for the purpose of deciding the case at
95 The tax agreements are not an effective substitute for the Rowell-
Sirois recommendations because they do not in fact achieve equalization,
supra, footnotes 24, 87, 88, and because they are neither permanent nor
universal.
96 See J. H. Perry, Federal-Provincial Tax Negotiations, No. 10, Canadian
Tax Papers.
97 (1959) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 544 (B.C. S.C.).
98 1953 (B.C. 2nd sess.) c. 33 amended 1955, c. 79.
99 g upra, footnote 97, at p. 557.
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bar, but he in no way even attempted to touch on the question here
in issue.
The position of Quebec in the system of tax rental agreements
has been alternately supported as-a vindication of provincial rights
and condemned as a thorn in the financial side of Canadian
tax relations. If in fact these agreements are nothing more than
agreements, then Quebec is perfectly within her rights to refuse
to deal with the Dominion on any terms of which she does not
approve: however, if these agreements represent an ingenious device
bk which Ontario and British Columbia are pumping out the
sinking ship of the Maritimes and keeping the sails of a faltering
Manitoba and a politically tragic Saskatchewan, then it is unques-
tionably the duty of the taxation authorities to consider these
problems in conference in order to devise a method by which
Quebec will bear her full share of support. Again, this leads back
to the best solution, yet the most difficult of achievement-amend-
ment to the B.N.A. Act.
Taxation agreements, which are not in fact taxation agreements
but a "blind" for aid to the needy, no matter how workable or
beneficial to the economy, are unconstitutional. A subsidy by any
other name is still a subsidy. 0 0
100 Montague v. Capulet (sub-nom R?. v. J.), 34 Shakespear 1.
NOTE: The writers express their appreciation to Mr. Julian Porter for his
assistance in research.
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